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ABSTRACT
Discussing  Public  Service  Broadcasting  from  the  perspective  of  the  public  sphere  has  both 
historical form and theoretical rationale. This article surveys some of the arguments forwarded on 
the  commonality  between  the  theoretical  category  of  the  public  sphere,  and  Public  Service 
Broadcasting (PSB). Drawing from scholarly work over the past three decades, it also addresses the 
problems with this approach, outlining an argument against applying public sphere theory in this 
setting.  This  article  then  applies  normative  arguments  drawn from Habermasian  theory  to  the 
subject,  arguing that public sphere theory remains a critical  tool for studying PSB. This article 
suggests that on the public sphere principles of inclusion, deliberation and opinion formation, PSB 
helps  sustain  the  notion  of  the  public  sphere,  and  indeed  provides  one  of  the  most  important 
realisations of it. In particular, this article focuses on PSB in the UK, and gives evidence from the 
case of the BBC to support its claims. 
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This article will address Public Service Broadcasting from the perspective of public sphere theory. 
Having addressed the range of arguments forwarded on the commonality between the theoretical 
category of  the public  sphere,  and of  Public  Service Broadcasting (PSB),  I  will  forward three 
normative  arguments  for  PSB  as  an  underpinning  and  enabling  force  of  the  public  sphere. 
Addressing PSB in the UK, this article will address the  principle of inclusion,  the  principle of 
deliberation, and the principle of opinion formation. In particular, I will adopt Jürgen Habermas’s 
theory of the public sphere, mainly set out in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1989)  (STPS), but will also draw on his other and sometimes differing accounts  (1997; 2006; 
2009). Given the scope of this article, I will not have the space to consider the many competing 
theories of the public sphere, that  are critical of Habermas’s account. This article will thus not 
consider the full range of arguments that could be made on this subject, but rather serves as an 
overview of the central points, and may act as a stimulus for further scholarly debate.
PSB and public sphere theory: an overview 
Contemporary academic discourse has drawn comparisons between the public sphere and PSB. 
Theorists have debated whether or not PSB is formative of the public sphere and crucial to its 
existence.  Curran (1991),  Garnham (1986) and Scannell  (1989)  argue that  PSB fits  the central 
Habermasian public sphere narrative. Curran argues that Habermas’s account of the public sphere 
was  historically  flawed  (1991:  42),  but British  PSB  offers  a clearer  example  of  Habermas’s 
normative conception of the public sphere. On this he argues: 
His conception of reasoned discourse is closer to the practice of 
British  public-service  broadcasting,  with  its  ideology  of 
disinterested professionalism,  its  careful  balancing of opposed 
points of view and umpired studio discussions that it is to that of 
the polemicist and faction-ridden London press of the eighteenth 
century,  operating  in  the  context  of  secret  service  subsidies, 
opposition  grants  and  the  widespread  bribing  of  journalists. 
(ibid.)
Curran is suggesting that the normative element of Habermas’s work closely mirrors that of the 
operation of the BBC. He argues that conceiving of a model of multiple and competing public 
spheres better fits Habermas’s time period of analysis, and that rather it is not until the PSB era and 
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the BBC, but before satellite television, that we can point to a “unitary public sphere” (ibid.: 43).
In a similar way, Garnham argues that addressing the model of PSB as an analogy of the public 
sphere is important, given that the two models share the same “strengths and weaknesses” (1986: 
45). For Garnham the strength of PSB, based upon the imperatives of public sphere theory is that 
“it  (a)  presupposes  and then tries to  develop in  its  practice a  set  of social  relations which are 
distinctly political rather than economic, and (b) at the same time attempts to insulate itself from 
control by the state as opposed to, and this is often forgotten, political control” (ibid.). Despite his 
arguments in support of the PSB model, Garnham notes, “its failure to recognize the problem of 
mediation within the Public Sphere and thus the role of knowledge-brokers within the system” 
(ibid.:  49).  Here  he  is  particularly  thinking  about  the  “social  function  of  both  journalists  and 
politicians”  (Garnham,  1986:  49).  In  relation  to  journalists,  he  argues  that  they  are  largely 
unaccountable on the measure of how they serve the public interest, and lack adequate training. 
Scannell argues for the foundational role of public sphere theory in “the study of modern societies 
and the contributory role of modern media” (Scannell, 1989: 136). Arguing that PSB must be first 
and foremost “a service to the public” (ibid.: 135), Scannell asserts that PSB is crucial to the very 
idea of publicness:
What was  public  life before broadcasting? In a general  sense 
there were certain kinds of buildings and spaces in which people 
could meet, outside their homes, for relaxation, pleasure or self-
improvement;  public  parks  and  libraries  and  public  houses. 
More specifically there were public  events  that  took place in 
particular places for particular publics. (ibid.: 139-140)
In one sense, he is at odds here with Habermas, in that PSB does not feature much in Habermas’s 
central account in  STPS  (although I will address how it appears in his later work). However, as 
many scholars argue, the Habermasian model of the public sphere retains a normative value that 
renders it  necessary and critical (Castells,  2008; Curran, 2000; Durham-Peters, 1993; Garnham, 
1986;  1992;  2007).  It  is  to  this  normative  value  that  Scannell  attaches  his  argument  about 
publicness; for him, it is under PSB that the public sphere is finally realisable. Whilst Habermas 
argues, “Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens” (1997: 105), for Scannell 
this did not happen during Habermas’s time period. Rather, it is PSB that enables this inclusive 
condition. On this he argues, “The fundamentally democratic thrust of broadcasting lay in the new 
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kind of access to virtually the whole spectrum of public life that radio first, and later television, 
made available to all” (Scannell, 1989: 140). 
The  central  critique  of  applying  public  sphere  theory to  PSB comes  from Keane (1995),  who 
dismisses the idea that the public sphere and PSB can be used as analogous categories (Keane, 
1995: 4). Setting aside his concerns - amongst which are that Garnham over looks the problems of 
drawing a line between the historical conditions of the public sphere “with the peculiarly twentieth-
century practice  of  electronic  broadcasting”  (ibid.)  -  Keane  suggests  that  there  has  been  great 
decline in the public service model throughout the twentieth century. This is similar to the argument 
made  by Golding  that  “the  translation  and  dissemination  of  Habermas’s  ideas  in  English,  has 
coincided  with  the  crisis  in  public  service  broadcasting,  and  indeed  the  public  sphere  more 
generally” (1995: 26). 
To understand this decline, Keane identifies three causes:
(1) “Fiscal squeeze”: by this he means that public service broadcasters have faced deteriorating 
incomes, as rising incomes peaked in the 1970s (Keane, 1995.: 5)
(2) “Legitimacy problems”: by this he means that “both audiences and broadcasters sense that the 
public service claim to representativeness is in fact a defence of virtual representation of a fictive 
whole, a resort to programming which simulates the actual opinions and tastes of some of those at 
whom it is directed” (ibid.: 6). As an example here he offers the example of the problems of trying 
to reflect a national music culture in PSB, given the myriad “publics” with different tastes in music.
(3) “Technological change”: by this he means that new and emerging technologies (writing in 1995) 
have “destroyed the  traditional  argument  that  the scarcity of  available  spectrum blesses  public 
service broadcasting with the status of a ‘natural monopoly’ within the boundaries of a given nation 
state” (ibid.: 7). 
Broadly, as a result of these three points, Keane rejects the comparison between the public sphere 
and PSB, given the fundamental  shift  in  the environment  in  which public  service broadcasters 
operate. Instead he argues, we should bring the concept to bear on “phenomena as disparate as 
ISSN 1755-9944 4
Networking Knowledge: Journal of the MeCCSA Postgraduate Network, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010)
computer  networking,  citizen’s  initiatives,  newspaper  circulation,  satellite  broadcasting,  and 
children playing video games” (ibid.: 16). 
 
If the account from Curran, Garnham, Scannell and Keane represent the two main sides of the 
debate, Karppinen et al. (2008) argue for a more nuanced understanding of the common ground 
between public sphere theory and PSB. On one hand they suggest that “Practices of public service 
broadcasting  have  historically  never  corresponded  to  the  ideal  public  sphere.  Nor  do  they 
automatically fit a future realisation or approximation” (2008: 12). However, on the other hand they 
argue “public service broadcasting can be presented as the institutional space which is best able to 
realise  the  principles  of  communicative action  in  the  public  sphere:  freedom from commercial 
pressures, undistorted communication, consensual procedures, rational debate and at least ideally 
the expression of social unity” (ibid.: 13). In pursuing a way forward, Karppinen et al. suggest that 
the Habermasian account should be held in tension with Chantal Mouffe’s account of  agonistic  
pluralism. In Mouffe’s account, she sets out to critique deliberative democracy - a category closely 
associated  with  debate  on  the  public  sphere  -  suggesting  that  the  basic  premise  underpinning 
deliberative democracy is wrongly conceived (1999). She argues that democratic legitimacy should 
come  not  come  through  rationality,  as  democracy should  never  try  to  eliminate  antagonisms 
between different groups. 
This debate connects back to PSB with regard to the manner in which PSB deals with difference 
and diversity within society, and how public service broadcasters portray this in the type of content 
that they produce. On this Karppinen et al. argue that the arguments for PSB can be made from the 
model of agonistic pluralism: 
In  a  political  and  cultural  environment  which  has  promoted 
difference  and  pluralism,  arguments  for  public  service 
broadcasting need to consider more fully the issues of pluralism 
and conflict.  Such an understanding of the democratic role of 
the  media  informed  by  an  agonistic  model  of  democracy 
provides  an  alternative  to  both  the  singular  proliferation  of 
private  media  outlets  and  the  outmoded  view  of  public 
broadcasting.  (Karppinen et al., 2008: 13)
As they advance their argument, they eventually accept that there is value from the accounts of both 
Habermas and Mouffe (ibid.: 14). It is however to the central Habermasian account of the public 
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sphere that I turn to, to make normative arguments for the role and position of PSB in constituting 
the public  sphere.  In  part,  I  want  to  draw on later  Habermasian  theory,  when Habermas  turns 
directly to the subject of PSB, in a manner that he had hitherto left unexplored to any great extent. 
Here I want to turn to three core public sphere principles, and to show how PSB fulfills these 
principles, in a manner that is seen less elsewhere in the “media system” (Habermas, 2009: 166). In 
particular, I am referring to PSB conditions in the UK, as realised through the TV Licence that 
funds the BBC. 
1. The Principle of Inclusion
The principle of inclusion  can be seen throughout Habermas’s public sphere account: “Access to 
the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens” (Habermas, 1997: 105). Whilst this was not the 
case  in  the  historic  setting  as  Habermas  initially  wanted  to  suggest,  as  a  principle  it  remains 
important kernel to the idea of a public sphere: PSB is  in principle open to all,  as well as being 
fairly successful at achieving inclusiveness. On this we can point to a number of factors to find 
corroboration for this. First, the cost of purchasing a TV licence is comparatively low, compared to 
UK average income and compared to other media subscription services. The monthly cost of the 
licence fee equates to £12.13, or roughly £4 per week (Ramsey, 2010a: 13). In contrast, the median 
“weekly pay for full-time employees in the UK grew by 2.0 per cent in the year to April 2009 to 
reach £489” (ONS, 2009). Whilst this does not take account of people on benefits, some pensioners, 
and those who earn much less than the median amount, it still represents a fairly low and affordable 
cost for most of the population. Outside of this, the TV licence is free for those seventy-five years 
of age and over, discounted by half for the blind, and costs a statutory amount of £5 for those living 
in residential care (Directgov, 2010). Compared to the BBC’s main competitor, BSkyB, the cost of 
the TV Licence is remarkably low. In June 2010, the cheapest package advertised by BSkyB in June 
2010 was £18/month (BSkyB, 2010). As I have shown elsewhere, “Whilst this price includes free 
phone and broadband provision, it must be noted that to receive additional content to that which is 
commonly free-to-air with FreeView or FreeSat, costs much more” (Ramsey, 2010a: 14). However, 
for a Sky package that includes elements that are distinctive to the service, including entertainment, 
movies and sport, costs £48.50/month (BSkyB, 2010).
ISSN 1755-9944 6
Networking Knowledge: Journal of the MeCCSA Postgraduate Network, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010)
Second, equipment costs to engage with PSB in the UK remain low and would not be considered 
prohibitive to accessibility. Whilst purchasing a television may remain relatively expensive (though 
cheaper in 2010 than ever before), one can access scores of BBC radio stations and access hundreds 
of hours of public service programming, from a radio that can be purchased for a couple of pounds. 
Moreover, as the Coalition Government pursues a policy of “digital switch over”, allowance has 
been made for providing assistance for those who need help with changes to equipment (BBC, 
2010a).  Third,  PSB remains  considerably  more  financially  accessible  than  the  Internet,  which 
remains inaccessible to many in the UK, with 30 per cent of people without personal online access 
(ibid.). This group breaks down roughly into two groups: those excluded for financial reasons, and 
those excluded through lack  of  interest.  On the first,  fifty-five  percent  of  people excluded for 
financial  reasons  live  in  “social  category  DE  homes”  (DCMS,  2009:  33.  As  I  have  argued 
elsewhere, “That the disadvantaged socioeconomically are more likely to be digitally excluded, 
should be of no surprise, given that the cost of accessing the Internet remains relatively high and 
prohibitive  to  many”  (Ramsey,  2010b:  1).  The  cost  of  having  Internet  access  at  home,  which 
includes expensive equipment and relatively high monthly charges, may run to many hundreds of 
pounds. On the second, an Ofcom report “found that even if a computer and Internet connection 
were provided for free to those without the Internet at home, 43 per cent would decline this offer” 
(ibid.). Moreover, we see problems in terms of broadband provision to certain remote parts of the 
country to a much greater extent than that of lack of access to television and radio signals. On these 
counts, financial exclusion, lack of interest, and lack of coverage we see nothing comparable to 
PSB.  Rather  PSB  remains  relatively  affordable  to  the  user  in  terms  of  the  TV Licence  and 
equipment, uptake and access of PSB is almost universal. 
2. The principle of deliberation
The  principle of  deliberation  is at the centre of the public sphere,  and has led to much shared 
scholarly work between public sphere theory and deliberative democracy theory. As citizens debate 
and deliberate on ideas, the public sphere is formed and reformed. Habermas argues in STPS that “a 
set of basic rights concerned the sphere of the public engaged in rational-critical debate (freedom of 
opinion and speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and association etc.) and the political 
function of private people in this public sphere (right of petition, equality of vote etc.)” (1989: 83). 
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In order to debate in an informed manner, interlocuters in the public sphere must have access to 
information of a political nature. Whilst this is by no means limited to PSB, it is perhaps public 
service broadcasters who provide the most accessible and voluminous content of a serious political 
nature. This information can then be tested, proved and analysed in the public sphere, in debate that 
takes place in the public square, the workplace and the coffee house (as in Habermas’s historical 
account). Public service content provides the material needed for interlocutors to participate in what 
Habermas calls “rational-critical” debate (ibid.: 58).
How this debate takes place, and indeed the societal structures that the public sphere requires for 
debate to take place, is itself another subject. A public well informed by PSB, but without the means 
to debate the information, is a poor reflection of Habermas’s public sphere. In his later work (2006; 
2009), Habermas accepts the dominance of the media system over face-to-face debate, although he 
does argue that that this leads to a poorer quality  public sphere. On this he argues that the political 
public sphere that does remain, is “dominated by the kind of mediated communication that lacks the 
defining  features  of  deliberation”,  with  a  shortfall  in  “face-to-face  interaction  between  present 
participants in a shared practice of collective decision-making” and a “lack of reciprocity between 
the roles of speakers and addressees in an egalitarian exchange of claims and opinions” (2006: 8-9). 
Habermas  is  unequivocal  about  the  importance  of  the  role  that  he  thinks  Public  Service 
Broadcasting plays. He states: “Its loss would rob us of the centerpiece of deliberative politics” 
(ibid.: 27). In other words, if PSB was eventually completely eroded, the very centre of the public 
sphere would be lost. 
The ‘refeudalised’ public sphere - the term that Habermas uses in STPS to chart the shift from the 
bourgeois public sphere to the one we can chart contemporaneously-  is a poor reflection of the 
normative public sphere model that I deploy. Increasingly, the public do not have the institutional 
infrastructure required to participate in an ‘ideal-type’ public sphere. Indeed, it is here that PSB may 
play a  role:  not  only supplying  the  content  necessary for  a  functioning  public  sphere,  but  the 
infrastructure for it  also.  This has been the case for many years,  whereby television and radio 
phone-ins provide one of the few ways of sustaining a national debate. They remain one of the few 
ways that a member of the public in the Shetland Islands may get a sense of the general opinion on 
an issue from the Channel Islands. The Internet, and its use by public service broadcasters, provides 
potential for greater deliberation here also. Dahlberg (2001) argues that the Internet is not an ideal 
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provider of deliberative democratic ideals, and is rather colonised by state and corporate interests 
(much like Habermas’s refeudalised public sphere). However, he reasons that “online spaces free 
from state and corporate power must be put aside for public deliberation; financial support from 
government and non-government sources is desperately needed to develop these spaces” (2001: 
629).  Here he leans on Blumler and Gurevitch’s argument in  The New Media and our Political  
Communication  Discontents  (2001),  where  they  proposed  “the  creation  of  a  publicly  funded 
authority,  independent  of  government,  that  would  have  the  responsibility  of  encouraging,  co-
ordinating, publicizing, and resourcing online deliberative initiatives” (ibid.: 630). In this article, 
Blumler and Gurevitch use the analogy of the history of radio; in this period the USA largely went 
with a market model, whilst European states largely favoured public service provision. For them, 
“The corresponding challenge today is to fashion and apply a public service remit for the Internet 
and other online service”’ (2001: 9). However, the use of the Internet by public service broadcasters 
holds potential here too.  Already, in the UK the BBC enables its audience online to comment on 
news stories, through the “Have Your Say” service (BBC, 2010b). Further developments might and 
should  occur,  enabling  PSB to  further  underpin  the  public  sphere  in  terms  of  the  principle  of 
deliberation. 
3. The principle of opinion formation 
The principle of opinion formation is one that is central to the public sphere, Habermas states: “By 
‘public sphere’ we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public 
opinion can be formed” (1997: 105). Interlocutors within the public sphere carry out reasoned and 
rational  debate,  and  from this  have  the  ability  to  form critical  opinions  on  matters  of  public 
importance. Through exposure to ideas, members of the public formulate opinions, which taken 
collectively formulate public opinion. On this principle, PSB provides a crucial means to enabling 
this. In the UK, the BBC is required institutionally and structurally to commit to a certain amount 
of  ‘public  service’ content.  By  this  I  mean  that  the  BBC  broadcasts  a  very  large  amount  of 
programming on news and current affairs, as well as on areas such as religion (an area not readily 
served by market provision and are required to cover a range of subjects, to give air-time to many 
cultural and political groups, and to report in a balanced and fair manner. Despite numerous charges 
of ‘dumbing-down’, and of the ‘celebrification’ of content (some of which are warranted) the BBC 
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remains at the forefront of PSB on a global scale. 
In his later work, Habermas (2009) holds that the quality press must remain at the centre of the 
public sphere, but as my argument relates to broadcasting, it is that area that I will focus on. In 
terms  of  broadcasting  in  a  “refeudalised”  public  sphere,  commercial  and  market-driven 
broadcasters are less effective at  providing the necessary infrastructure for a functioning public 
sphere. On this point, Habermas is unequivocal: 
Under  the  pressure  of  shareholders  who  thirst  for  higher 
revenues, it is the intrusion of the functional imperatives of the 
market economy into the ‘internal logic’ of the production and 
presentation of messages that leads to the covert displacement of 
one  category  of  communication  by  another:  […]  Besides 
personalization, the dramatization of events, the simplification 
of  complex  matters,  and  the  vivid  polarization  of  conflicts 
promotes  civic  privatism  and  a  mood  of  anti-politics. 
(Habermas, 2006: 26-27)
Thus he argues, greater marketisation of media lead us away from ‘public communication’, and in 
particular the type of journalism that PSB is required by statute in the UK to deliver. Instead, we are 
left with commercialised media delivering content that we recognise from Habermas’s description - 
especially the point about broadcasters “simplifying complex matters”. The normative argument 
here that can be derived from public sphere theory is that PSB must remain at the centre of the 
public sphere. However,  in the UK the drift  is towards putting PSB under greater threat;  these 
threats  come from competitors (see James Murdoch’s  2009 MacTaggart  Lecture -  discussed in 
Ramsey, 2010a), from government (see freeze in the TV licence until 2016-2017 announced in the 
Spending Review (HM Treasury, 2010: 66), and from within the BBC itself. Here, it is particularly 
worthwhile to note that the BBC strategy document  Putting Quality First  (BBC, 2010c), argues 
against some of the fundamental principles of PSB on a footing that is contrary to the evidence 
contained within the document itself. 
In conclusion, the theory of the public sphere as forwarded by Habermas remains a cogent and 
critical theory to apply to PSB, and is useful for making arguments in its favour. In particular, the 
theory of the public sphere remains flexible enough to change with developments in media and 
culture. However, it also remains rigid enough to deploy when making normative arguments, and 
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allows  the  public  sphere  researcher  to  make  concrete  claims  as  to  how  society  ought  to  be 
structured. In this article, I have not had the space to set out the problems with the PSB model 
generally,  and  with  the  BBC  as  it  exists  today  more  specifically.  These  problems  are  not 
insignificant,  especially on the subject  of increasing levels  of content  that  are  not  distinctively 
‘public service’ in their nature. Whilst I  have argued that the BBC remains a good provider of 
serious  political  content,  necessary  for  deliberation  and  opinion  formation,  it  has  also  been 
complicit in a more general slide towards replacing news with ‘infotainment’. Indeed, in returning 
to  Habermas’s  point  shown  above  -  “the  simplification  of  complex  matters,  and  the  vivid 
polarization of conflicts” (Habermas, 2006: 26-27) - we can recognise this in much BBC content. 
However, PSB on the whole remains one of the most satisfactory ways of sustaining a functioning 
public sphere, whilst the theory of the public sphere remains an important theoretical narrative for 
making arguments on behalf of PSB. 
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